Making Migrants Visible in Post-MDG Debates by Thieme, Susan & Ghimire, Anita
Sustainability 2014, 6, 399-415; doi:10.3390/su6010399 
 
sustainability 
ISSN 2071-1050 
www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability 
Article 
Making Migrants Visible in Post-MDG Debates 
Susan Thieme 
1,
* and Anita Ghimire 
2
 
1
 Department of Geography, University of Zurich, Winterthurerstrasse 190, 8057 Zurich, Switzerland  
2
 Department of Development Studies, Kathmandu University, Lalitpur, Kathmandu, Hattiban, P. B. 
No. 6250, Nepal 
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: susan.thieme@geo.uzh.ch;  
Tel.: +41-44-635-5147; Fax: +41-44-635-6844. 
Received: 20 May 2013; in revised form: 10 October 2013 / Accepted: 7 January 2014 /  
Published: 17 January 2014 
 
Abstract: While it is still a matter of global dialogue whether and how migration will 
feature in the post-2015 framework, remittance-dependent countries like Nepal clearly 
back migration in their post-Millennium Development Goal (MDG) discussions. We argue 
that a broader concept of mobility has to be integrated into those debates. This 
understanding would go beyond remittance-intense migration to include the increasing 
diversity of migration patterns and related commodification services, the close linkages 
between internal and international mobility, and the unequal access to and benefits of 
mobility, all of which calls for a more fundamental human rights perspective to be 
integrated into post-MDG-debates.  
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1. Introduction  
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Framework to meet the needs of the world’s poorest 
is going to expire in 2015, and discussions on what will follow are at their height [1]. Although 
migration was not included in the original MDG Framework, various direct and indirect linkages 
between migration and MDGs had become widely acknowledged in recent years [2]. More than 214 
million people worldwide live outside their country of origin, many of them as labor migrants who 
make significant contributions to the economies of both their receiving (host) and sending (home) 
countries [3]. This has resulted in widespread recognition of the advantages of international migration, 
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along with growing debate about its risks and challenges and a call for caution so as not to 
overemphasize the positive links between migration and development [4,5].  
Migration has been explicitly identified as an underrepresented topic and is seen as integral part of 
some of the major challenges discussed in the post-2015 debates [1]. Those migration and 
development policy debates stand alongside such ―buzzwords‖ [6] in the development field as how to 
generate inclusive growth and employment for a growing population, moving ―beyond aid‖ and 
creating international policies that enable countries to foster sustainable development through trade, 
migration and improved financial systems. There is also the idea of working towards better global 
partnerships—addressing the various migration stakeholders at various levels and across borders [1].  
More skeptical voices worry that, despite references to migration in the United Nations System 
Task Team report on the post-2015 agenda [7], labor migration is unlikely to be on the top of the 
development agenda. The topic of migration is often contentious and negotiation frameworks are tight, 
while immigration policies in the North and now the South have become increasingly restricted, 
seriously affecting migrants’ rights and their working and living conditions. Therefore, a rights-based 
agenda for migrants ties in well with the general request that any post-2015 development path has to be 
based on human rights [8].  
Nepal, one of the world’s top 10 remittance-receiving countries as a percentage of GDP (22%) [9], 
exemplifies ongoing debates about the integration of migration in post-MDG debates, and we wish to 
take this country as an example.  
Despite severe political crisis, Nepal managed to achieve several of its Millennium Development 
Goals for economic and social prosperity during the conflict period. Next to other governmental and 
non-governmental interventions, academics, and practitioners in Nepal also attribute these 
improvements to migration and remittances. Like other countries, Nepal included the MDGs in their 
pre-existing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) without fully adapting them to national or 
regional needs [10,11]. While the inclusion of local and regional needs into the concrete terminology 
of MDGs remains subject to skepticism, a closer look at migration in Nepal shows that policymakers 
and, increasingly, international donors have started to pick up on this topic. 
In their assessment of the achievements of the MDGs, the Nepal Planning Commission and United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) [12] identified a lack of employment opportunities and a 
shortage of human and financial resources as major constraints for Nepal’s development. They 
similarly acknowledged that migration for foreign employment and education purposes, and the 
resulting social and financial remittances, were a current mainstay for Nepal and the need to put 
migration forward in any post-MDG debate [12,13]. Creating employment in the country requires 
multidimensional efforts. However, encouraging investment of remittances and knowledge and skills 
of migrants in the productive sector in Nepal and demand-based training for foreign employment are 
some of the additional steps that the government of Nepal will take to accelerate MDG progress up to 
2015 and beyond [14].  
At the same time, migrants’ associations and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have 
already been pushing hard to force migration onto the policy agenda. There have been some significant 
achievements in terms of policy and programs, but the many controversies and remaining gaps 
illustrate the future policy challenges. Using the example of Nepal, we highlight characteristic 
challenges facing remittance-dependent countries. We will conclude that migration must form part of 
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any post-MDG debate but must first be understood more broadly, i.e. in terms of mobility; and second, 
any discussion about migration and development also has to take human rights into consideration. This 
understanding would go beyond remittance-intense migration to include the increasing diversity of 
migration patterns and related commodification of services, the close linkages between internal and 
international mobility, and the unequal access to and benefits of mobility. We will do that by, firstly, 
providing more conceptual background on the migration, development and human rights debate, and, 
secondly, shifting to Nepal and highlighting different dimensions and inequalities of mobility such as: 
(1) migration and remittances characteristics and inequalities in access to and benefit from migration; 
(2) internal mobility; (3) the role of brokers and the commodification of migration; and (4) the political 
representation of migrants, both international and national, as well as the gendered dimension of 
Nepal’s migration policy. Finally, we shall present the road ahead and come up with suggestions for 
aspects to be included in the post-MDG debate in Nepal, particularly from a human rights perspective. 
The paper is a reflection based on both authors’ long-standing and ongoing research into various 
dimensions of mobility in Nepal, including labor migration and student mobility [15,16], internal 
displacement [17,18], and collaborative work on the annual Nepal Migration Yearbook [19,20]. 
2. Migration, Development and Human Rights 
The formulation of global and national targets in the MDG debate masked inequalities. Therefore, 
discussions on a post-2015 framework highlight that any sustainable development path has to be based 
on the general right to development, human rights and social inclusion (including decent work and 
gender equality), as well as convergence, where all regions and countries have the right to prosper [21].  
In the more specific ―migration and development‖ debates, critical voices argue along similar lines.  
Inequalities in migration realities and the context of neoliberal globalisation have been substantially 
downplayed [22] by disregarding the root causes of migration, as well as the human and labor rights of 
migrants and the social costs of migration, while migration contributes to both the receiving country 
and the country of origin [23]. 
This ―unequal development‖ is described by an increase in social inequalities in terms of unequal 
concentration of capital and power and increasing disparities including reduced access to production 
and employment, declining working and living conditions and segmentation of social security systems 
within and between countries and regions ([23], p. 435). 
These growing inequalities lead to an increasing ―forced‖ element in migration, although this does 
not qualify as ―forced migration‖ under the official United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) definition. Officially labeled as voluntary and free, in reality it is unequal development and 
structural conditions that foster migration. Migration is fueled by violence, conflict, and catastrophe, 
but also by dispossession, exclusion, and unemployment. Subsumed into the category of ―economic 
migrants‖, it is assumed that they travel freely and are socially mobile, whereas in reality they are 
subject to extreme vulnerability and exposed to exploitation [23]. It is, therefore, crucial that human 
rights become an integral component of the migration and development discourse. A human rights 
perspective would include the protection of basic rights for migrants and their families, the right to 
freedom of movement, but essentially also the general right to development along with the right not to 
migrate ([23], pp. 437–438). We propose to take account of the human rights dimension in any future 
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discussion on the role of migration in the post-MDG framework. In the following sections we shed 
some light on existing inequalities in the migration process, starting with the question on who has 
access to which migration and its benefits. 
3. Inequalities in Access to Migration and its Benefits  
Poverty, unemployment, declining natural resources, and political instability are major reasons why 
international labor migration has become an increasingly important source of income for Nepal. Next 
to political and economic instability, migration has been also a ―rite of passage‖ being particularly for 
young men central to their transition into adulthood [24,25], as well as a door-opener to formal and 
informal education and gaining the experience that is central to further mobility [26]. International 
migration from Nepal has increased steadily in recent decades, and officially 7.5% of the total 
population of 28 million are now absentees. A total of 13% of these absentees are women [27]. While 
neighboring India was long the top destination, migrant destinations have diversified. A total of 41% 
of all Nepalese migrants still worked and lived in India in 2011, but the Gulf countries now host 38% 
of all Nepalese migrants, while 12% are in Malaysia, and another 9% in other countries [19]. These 
―other‖ countries include Nepali nurses working in the United Kingdom, the USA, New Zealand, and 
Australia (in 2008 those made up about 30% of all nurses working in Nepal) [28] and an increasing, 
but still very much under-researched, group of students (62,391 Nepali students were studying abroad 
in 2011), many of them also sending remittances back home [29]. 
The latest MDG Progress Report 2010 [30] and the Nepal Living Standard Survey [27] confirmed 
significant progress towards the achievement of MDG 1 (eradication of extreme poverty and hunger) 
by 2015, with the poverty rate falling to 25% for 2010/11 from 31% in 2003/4 and 42% in  
1995/96 [10,27]. 
However, the MDG Progress Report also highlights a significant variation in poverty by geographic 
region, with the high mountains and the western hills showing a higher percentage of poverty and 
slower fall than the Terai (lowland) and eastern parts of the country [10]. Although migration and 
remittances are certainly not the only factor influencing poverty decline, a detailed look at migrant’s 
destinations provides some possible correlations.  
In 2011, the official total amount of remittances was recorded as US$ 3.5 billion, or 22% of Gross 
National Product [31], although it is estimated that 35% of remittances go unrecorded [20]. At the 
household level, this means that 56% of families in Nepal receive remittances, which make up 31% of 
their household income [27]. Although 41% of the population works in India, only 11% of the 
remittances stem from India, with 26% originating from the Gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar), 8% from Malaysia, 35% from other countries, and 20% from internal migration [31,32].  
Varies studies indicate that the migrant workers going to India are mostly from the mountains and 
hills, and particularly the western part of Nepal. Despite the overall contribution of remittances to 
poverty reduction, there are indications that the beneficiaries of remittances tend to be families located 
in urban areas and generally central and eastern regions of Nepal with members working as migrants in 
countries other than India. Similarly, well-off families benefit the most from remittances [24,32,33]. 
Although far fewer remittances originate from India than from other countries, the mobility established 
between Nepal and India over generations remains the mainstay for many, especially in the western 
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region of the country. In rural households with little cash income, even small transfers of cash can be 
highly valuable to reduce the risks of seasonality, harvest failure, and food shortage. One must also 
consider aspects other than financial returns, such as sending goods. Having family members in India 
makes it easy to gain access to medical treatment and schooling in India, and migrants cover these 
costs rather than sending money to Nepal [34]. 
Therefore, international migration must also be seen as a highly selective and non-egalitarian 
process in Nepal, deeply entrenched in social networks through friends and family or brokers and the 
availability of information and seed capital. People with more seed capital and greater access to 
information are more likely to go to destinations with higher earnings, which often results in higher 
remittances. Consequently, it is not the poorest that benefit the most from migration.  
Furthermore, migration often has positive and negative aspects at the same time. For example, even 
when the economic status of non-migrating family members does improve, the cognitive and 
emotional dimensions are far more context-specific and can range for non-migrating women for 
example from gaining more autonomy and power to living under even stricter control by their parents-
in-law in the absence of the husbands [35–37]. There is also widespread criticism of labor conditions 
that verge on exploitation in many jobs. Excessive workloads, the denial of sufficient rest and holiday, 
inadequate payment, food and shelter, segregation in labor camps, and serious restrictions on 
communication with family members, as well as verbal and even physical abuse, have been recorded 
for various labor arrangements from nearby India [15] to more distant Gulf countries [24,38,39]. 
Furthermore, they lack knowledge about job opportunities outside Nepal, and recruiting procedures are 
often manipulated by brokers and employers. Many migrants must also cope with unsafe and 
inadequate means of remittance transfer.  
This high remittance dependency not only induces changes in household structures [27,31]; it also 
calls for a new conceptualisation of the rural economy. The 2001 population census revealed for the 
first time that more people lived in the plains (Terai) than in the hills and mountains of Nepal [40]. 
Interestingly, this internal population shift only led to limited urbanization: Nepal’s annual 
urbanization growth rate of 3.4% in 2002 [41] was one of the lowest in South Asia. Nevertheless, such 
―ruralness‖ is still often equated with agriculture. Despite suggestions by scholars to revise the 
relevance of agriculture, policymakers and researchers have long focused overly on agriculture while 
ignoring the relevance of remittances and their social and economic impacts beyond financial  
flows [25,42–44].  
Finally, in public discourse, Nepal is widely known as a labor-sending country. However, Nepal is 
also a receiving country. The recent census shows that there are 120,891 Indians, 15,447 Bangladeshi, 
and 2,572 Chinese citizens in Nepal [27], without taking into account regular but undocumented 
marriage migration across the open border, not only from Nepal to India, but also from India to Nepal. 
In addition to this, Nepal also hosts Bhutanese, Tibetan, and Somali refugees [27]. In addition, Nepal is 
increasingly becoming a popular meeting and transit hub in the region due to strict migration policies 
between India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, while citizens of all those countries can easily immigrate  
to Nepal [45].  
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4. Internal Mobility: A Blind Spot on the Development Agenda 
As in most countries worldwide [46], most mobility is in-country, mainly rural to urban or urban to 
urban, but also from rural to rural areas (e.g., highland-to-lowland migration).  
Overall, with increasing malaria control in the plains of Nepal (1971), internal migration from the 
hills to the plains increased by 41% from 1991 to 2001 [41,47]. Internal migration rates are higher for 
women than for men; marriage migration accounts for 23% of total inter-district mobility among 
women alone [46]. Furthermore, the categories of internal migration and displacement are often deeply 
intertwined with internal and international migration. 
During the last 12 years, much internal mobility was associated with displacement driven by the 
Maoist conflict and smaller subsequent conflicts, with 270,000 people internally displaced at the height 
of the Maoist conflict [48]. A further 5,000 people were displaced from Eastern Nepal by the Madhesh 
conflict, which started in the eastern Terai (plains) after the Maoist conflict. However, in both cases 
these figures underestimate the actual extent of displacement. For example, the figures do not cover 
people who went to India, as well as those who deliberately chose not to be categorized as displaced 
since there is a social stigma attached to being called a displaced (―bistapit‖) person. In addition, there 
was no system for registering as displaced in the case of the Madhesh conflict [49]. Despite efforts by 
the government to help people to return to their place of origin after conflict, there has not been much 
permanent return because, by the time the 10-year Maoist conflict ended, in 2006, people had already 
established multi-local livelihoods between their place of origin and new host communities, and so 
they were reluctant to return permanently. Besides, there were ongoing disputes in people’s home 
villages over ownership of the land and property confiscated by the Maoist. Similar disputes have 
affected people from the hill regions, who found themselves displaced to the Terai due to the Madhesh 
conflict [17,49]. 
The categories of national and international migrant as well as labor migrant and conflict-induced 
refugee became blurred. Inter-linkages between internal and international migration, as well as 
complex return-characteristic where people would rather situate their future prospects in better-
developed urban or peri-urban areas, became typical of most mobile people. While internal migration 
might be the only way for the poorest to find an income source, for better-off people internal migration 
is often linked to their own international migration and sometimes that of former generations, such as 
parents or grandparents [50].  
Migration therefore often develops into multi-local livelihoods connecting places within and often 
outside Nepal. People will derive the income necessary to sustain or establish the new home in the 
plains of Nepal by working or having a family member working abroad, still they might have 
responsibilities and/or emotional attachments (e.g. through land or relatives) to their place of origin in 
the hills. International and internal migrants alike not only sustain their non-migrating family members 
through remittances, but also provide networks of access to medical care and education in better-
developed urban and peri-urban areas, as well as jobs for subsequent migrants. This is how they 
maintain their transnational and national rural-urban linkages [34]. 
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5. Commodification of Migration: The Role of Recruitment Agencies 
The ―economics of migration‖ [51,52] go far beyond remittances and institutions managing 
remittance transfer. In general, there is an increasing commodification of mobility-related services 
such as information, application forms, and visa or travel arrangements. Those services have been 
taken up by a growing number of private companies specialized in placing Nepali workers abroad, 
particularly in other countries than neighboring India [24,43]. Popularly known as ―manpower 
agencies‖, they are officially regulated by the government of Nepal and are required to register. The 
769 registered agencies (as of March, 2013) do have a major stake in the migration process and 
recruited 69% of Nepali workers in 2011/2012, excluding migrants going to India [19].  
The second group involved in the recruiting process are middlemen (or brokers). They are the 
crucial link between (potential) migrants and manpower agencies. Known locally as agents, who send 
people abroad, a large majority of them are not registered. They are unregulated and work on an 
individual, unregistered and entirely independent basis in local communities [53]. At present, Nepal’s 
migration-related norms such as the Foreign Employment Act only control the recruiting agencies and 
registered agents and have not reached these middlemen. Current policies even discourage middlemen 
from registering, since there is a provision that these agencies have to bear full legal responsibility if 
anything irregular happens to the person abroad [53]. 
It is not only increasing service provision to labor migrants, educational consultants also play an 
active role in international student mobility. In Nepal, for example, 205 consultancies are currently 
registered under the umbrella of the Educational Consultancy Association of Nepal. In 2010/11, 
11,912 young adults officially went abroad for higher education purposes [29]. These brokers are 
important gatekeepers to educational institutions outside Nepal, especially for ―first-time students‖. 
They facilitate the whole information, application and admission procedure and provide assistance for 
preparatory examinations, such as language tests. Given increasing student mobility and the growing 
number of educational consultancies, relatively little is known about the critical role of those 
intermediaries and how they operate. In many cases, the boundaries between education and work have 
become increasingly blurred. For example, in response to changes in visa requirements for Western 
countries (such as the UK), professionals have become ―international education‖ brokers [28]. 
6. Political Representation of Mobile People 
In a context of high international and internal mobility, questions of political representation and 
participation are becoming ever more complex. Such processes of differentiation, inequality, and 
potential exclusion not only call for an analysis of power as the direct assertion of will, but also an 
examination of "agenda-setting power" and political representation [54].  
Over the last years the number of associations and Non Governmental Organization related to 
migration has been growing [55]. Considering both international and internal migration, we provide 
some examples of political representation and how migrants practice their Nepali citizenship in Nepal 
and abroad. 
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6.1. Diaspora, International Migration and Citizenship 
International migrants are often deprived of political participation in their new host country, but 
they might also face obstacles to retaining transnational ties and practicing their citizenship in their 
home country. 
In Nepal, there is no provision in the constitution so far for migrants to participate directly in 
political affairs such as taking part in elections from their country of destination. While Nepali migrant 
associations in neighboring India have been active for a very long time [15] an increasing number of 
Nepalis in countries other than India have organized themselves in recent years. At the moment, the 
Non-Residential Nepalese (NRN) association is the main actor in negotiating with the government of 
Nepal for the political representation of Nepalis abroad. Anybody who has stayed outside Nepal for 
182 days can become a member of the NRN by paying a membership fee. They currently have  
co-ordination councils in 60 countries. For the time being, members are mainly high- and semi-skilled 
migrants, but membership is increasing and broadening in terms of professional and socio-economic 
spread. If NRN members are politically active, they also represent and manage overseas branches of 
Nepali political parties and arrange events such as visits of political representatives and political 
debates. At the moment, the NRN’s discussions with Nepal’s government focus on the possibility of 
introducing double citizenship for Nepalis, which is not possible at the moment.  
The diaspora organization also marks its presence through other activities. For example, they have 
donated trolleys with their logo to Kathmandu international airport, funded a homestay for elderly and 
established a public building called ―kriyaputri bhawan‖, where Hindus can stay during family funeral 
ceremonies. Those activities very much represent their active negotiation for social and political space 
in their home country of Nepal.  
6.2. Political Representation of Internal Migrants 
Generally Nepalis are allowed to move freely within their country without many bureaucratic 
obstacles—a right that is not automatically granted in all countries of the world (e.g., on Kyrgyzstan [56]. 
Those who have migrated voluntarily can register for elections in their place of destination—but only 
if they own land at that destination. If people do not own land, they have to return to their place of 
origin to cast their vote. In addition, each political party has their district representatives and a contact 
forum in the capital Kathmandu (e.g., Ilam Samparka Manch for Ilam district) that initiates frequent 
interactions, discussions and social events, such as picnics for people who have moved from their 
district to Kathmandu.  
The situation was different for persons who were forcibly displaced during the Maoist conflict. 
People displaced by the Maoist and other conflict victims formed the Maoist Victim Association in 
order to assert their demands. They organized regular protests and demonstrations to demand security, 
livelihood options and compensation for the loss of their livelihoods, property and in many cases also 
their family members. The leaders of the Maoist Victim Association were very prominent in 
Kathmandu and some of them are now represented in the Local Peace Committee (LPC) and other 
organizations working with victims of the conflict. However, like other internal migrants, internally 
displaces persons (IDPs) can now move freely to and from their place of origin and exercise their 
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political rights by participating in elections or engaging in political activities in their home districts 
through membership of political institutions. However, despite the importance of political rights, most 
of the Maoist Victim Association’s demands concerned basic livelihoods rather than political 
participation. The first priority was health and education, especially for children and teenagers, 
followed by access to employment. The freedom to exercise political rights had lower priority at the 
time [57,58]. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that the people displaced by the Maoist armed 
conflict (1996–2006) could not take part in the Constitutional Election that followed the 2006 peace 
agreement. However, they are now free to move to their village of origin. 
6.3. International Migration—Safe Migration 
Migration has become a concern for Nepal’s government but the focus is clearly on labor migration 
to countries responsible for the bulk of remittances such as the Gulf countries, Malaysia, Japan and 
Korea. Nepal’s government took various steps to address migration issues. The agenda included the 
creation of a Department of Foreign Employment under the Ministry of Transport and Labour 
Management and the establishment of the Foreign Employment Promotion Board within this 
department, as well as the establishment of the Foreign Employment Tribunal (Nyayadhikaran).  
In addition, Migration Resource Centers offer information and pre-departure training courses to 
aspiring migrants. Labor Attachés were appointed in major destinations for Nepali workers, and labor 
agreements were signed with the main destinations to better protect workers’ rights, to negotiate 
minimum wages and to allow rescue and relief operations for Nepali migrant workers encountering 
difficult circumstances.  
Despite these efforts, Nepal is struggling to develop a holistic national migration policy. Nepal’s 
Foreign Employment Act (2007) and Foreign Employment Regulation (2008) focus entirely on the 
protection and safety of migrants in their destination. As such, they do not cover the barriers migrants 
face before going abroad. Nepal recently drafted the National Foreign Employment Policy 2011. The 
National Planning Commission and the Ministry of Labour and Employment commissioned 
organizations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to review previous acts and 
regulations and develop an action plan for labor migration. Nevertheless, the Nepal National Interim 
Plan [59] and the National Youth Policy of Nepal [60] reveal that the government of Nepal views 
migration as a short-term benefit but aims to focus on employment creation in Nepal in the long run, in 
the hope of preventing large numbers of labor migrants.  
6.4. Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)  
Local NGOs have been a major driver in bringing the topic of migration to the public and pushing 
the government to take action. For example, the Pravasi Nepali Co-ordination Committee (PNCC) is a 
very active committee that lobbies with the government of Nepal as well as migrants and human right 
organization abroad for rights and protection of migrant workers, safe migration and rescue initiatives, 
resources and counseling for migrants, and networking of migrants in the Gulf and Malaysia. In 
addition to this, it also works towards reintegration of migrants to their home community. Another 
NGO, the People’s Forum for Human Rights, also publishes and provides regular information about 
legal issues related to migration. Similarly, the Asian Human Rights and Cultural Development Forum 
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(AHRCDF) works with the diaspora and on safer migration. One Nepali NGO has been very successful 
in establishing a radio program (Pourakhi) to better disseminate information to migrants and potential 
migrants about the dangers and opportunities of migration. A further example is that NGOs have been 
doing increasing national and regional lobbying to make the voices of migrants heard, most 
prominently through CARAM (Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility) Asia and the 
Migrant Forum Asia. Both networks are alliances of NGOs working on migration in different 
countries, and selected Nepali NGOs are a part of them. However, the perception of inter-linkages 
between foreign employment and development is mixed. For example, CARAM Asia is critical about 
overemphasizing the link between migration and development, seeing it as potentially turning migrants 
into a commodity for development purposes. On the other hand, the Migrant Forum Asia has a positive 
stance of migration and development. In their view, migration has brought employment for the 
400,000 Nepali youths entering the labour market every year that would otherwise be difficult to 
absorb, since Nepal offers very few employment opportunities. Similarly, international donors, such as 
the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC) and HELVETAS Swiss Inter-cooperation, 
have started to take up migration—particularly safe migration and pre-departure training. Similarly, 
the German Agency for Development Cooperation (GIZ) has worked on promoting student returnees 
to use their knowledge and skills in Nepal. Despite these initiatives, international donors are a long 
way from placing migration at the top of the agenda in their practical work.  
6.5. Safety and Gender in Migration  
NGOs and networks like CARAM Asia have been particularly critical of Nepal’s gendered 
migration policy. In terms of governance, the major policies (Foreign Employment Policy, 2011, 
Foreign Employment Act, 2007, Foreign Employment Regulation, 2008) demonstrate no sexual 
discrimination when it comes to sending Nepalis abroad for employment. In practice however, Nepal’s 
migration policy considers mobility by men and women in very different ways. Officially, only 13% of 
Nepal’s migrants are women. However, Gurung et al. [52] have shown that women account for as 
much as 30% of the total of migrant workers going abroad, and 66% of these were employed as 
domestic workers. Various studies emphasize the wide spectrum of experiences of women working as 
domestic workers. These experiences range from risks of exploitation in often informal and 
exclusively private spaces to potential income and independence from patriarchal family and 
community settings and personal advancement through exposure to other environments and economic 
independence [61]. 
The Nepalese government looked in particular at the risks of women being exploited and restricted 
women’s international mobility for domestic work with the intention of protecting women from 
different forms of physical and psychological abuse. This is due to the growing number of cases of 
women being abused while employed in domestic work in other countries. Restrictions ranging from 
outright bans to discriminatory limitations in various ways were imposed, lifted and re-imposed many 
times. At present, there is a ban on women under 30 leaving to work in informal sectors that are not 
covered by host countries’ labor laws. This was on the recommendation of the Gulf countries 
themselves and in line with other South Asian countries like Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 
However, organizations working on female migration often argue that such restrictions have in fact 
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increased women’s vulnerability and denied them the right of mobility. They are of the opinion that the 
recent and widespread confusion about the legality of women’s migration has not stopped the flow of 
women, but instead forced women to choose even riskier paths to employment abroad. Curtailing 
women’s mobility is not only discriminatory but has also been counterproductive in combating 
trafficking [52].  
The latest data on worker recruitment also hints that women take greater risks than men. 
Recruitment is strongly gendered. Proportionately more women migrant workers (70%) go out on 
―individual‖ visas than men (30%). ―Individual‖ visas indicate that the worker has arranged the visa by 
himself or herself through personal invitation, unauthorized and unregistered brokers and that it is a 
tourist visa or overstay, whereas an ―institutional‖ source indicates recruitment agencies. Despite 
criticism and the risks of unprofessional manpower agencies - which sometimes also operate 
informally - overall they are still considered to be a safer option than individually arranged visas [19]. 
One of the reasons why women use official recruitment less can be traced back to the legal restrictions 
on movement. Furthermore, women often experience much less encouragement to go abroad. They 
lack information and support to prepare properly as a result, hesitate to choose the official recruitment 
procedure and would contact the unregistered brokers instead. In addition to this, recruiting agencies 
do not openly send women for domestic work. This is because the recruiting agencies have to bear the 
liability if anything happens to the women at destination or if she is not given the job that was 
promised in the agreement and/or returns to Nepal. There is no liability if women go via informal 
channels. Thus, it is more lucrative for the recruitment agencies to hire brokers through which they 
send the women.  
7. Conclusion and Road Ahead  
While it is still a matter of global debate whether and how migration will feature in the post-2015 
framework, remittance-dependent countries like Nepal clearly back migration in their post-MDG 
debates. Though migration is not seen as a long-term and sustainable solution to addressing 
unemployment in Nepal, the government envisions using the financial remittances, knowledge, and 
skills of migrants to create employment and foster development in the country. Similarly, they will 
support demand-based training for foreign employment at the time being.  
Despite national particularities, we argue that Nepal presents various characteristics typical of other 
remittance-dependent countries. There are similar concerns about the sustainability of remittances for 
families and the country, protection of migrants including their human rights, and interlinkages 
between internal and international migration, as well as the commodification of migration.  
Based on the example of Nepal, we strongly argue that, as MDGs impact on people’s mobility and 
vice versa, a broader concept of mobility has to be built into the post-MDG debate. In this context, 
conceptions of mobility should move beyond selective international labor migration to all kinds of 
movement internally as well as international as well as broader issues of mobility such as recruitment, 
transport and communication, and would inevitably place strong emphasis on protection of migrants 
and ―equal opportunities‖ for mobility, regardless of gender, socio-economic status and ethnicity. 
Mobility is deeply entrenched in global politics and economics and requires global, regional, and 
bilateral cooperation by all actors, such as governments, the private sector (including employers and 
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facilitators, such as recruiting agencies), migrants themselves and their families, and migrants’ 
associations, NGOs, international donors, and the research community. Therefore, a post-2015 agenda 
requires enhanced cooperation and coherence between the aforementioned actors across borders and at 
various levels. These global interdependencies are best addressed through what in the recent MDGs 
has been labeled as global partnerships [1]. 
Linking migration with the more fundamental demand for human rights, we suggest the following 
four rights [23] and related points to be included in any post-2015 framework. We suggest this as a 
road ahead:  
(1). The right to development would include the well-being and basic needs of all people, along with 
their individual opportunities to develop and participate in decision-making processes. This would also 
imply creating decent and fulfilling employment opportunities in the current migrant’s destinations as 
well as in Nepal. In Nepal these would go hand in hand with investment in productive sectors such as 
industry, commerce, transport, communication and agriculture. Although remittances are assumed to 
play a role in those development efforts in Nepal, they certainly cannot replace investments and efforts 
by the government and private sector and foreign direct investment.  
Nevertheless, the right to development should be decoupled from unsustainable patterns of 
consumption and production, since costs such as environmental changes once again disproportionately 
affect the most vulnerable groups and might also lead into even more forced migration.  
(2). The right to choose not to migrate: This right to immobility is closely linked to point 1. the 
right to development, and involves creating the right conditions in Nepal so that people do not feel 
forced to migrate and can stay where they want to. Movement (including choice of destination) should 
be available to all, but it should be a free choice and not forced in any way, be it for political, social or 
economic reasons.  
(3). An inclusive and sustainable approach would include the right to freedom of movement within 
and across countries, independent from gender, ethnicity, or socio-economic status – a right that 
remains a privilege for very few people worldwide. Nevertheless, from a Nepalese perspective this 
would include finding other ways to address protection concerns but removing bans and conditions on 
migration for their citizens (e.g., the age-specific ban on women’s migration for domestic work). For 
internal displacement this would imply that those internally displaces persons who choose not to return 
should be allowed to participate in the political process from the places where they currently reside. 
(4). Basic rights of migrants and their families 
The human rights of all migrants in sending, receiving and transition countries should be guaranteed, 
including access to decent employment, public services, and security. This could translate into more 
concrete actions, such as:  
Policies and actions should take account of the different stages of migration separately: life in the 
home country, pre-departure preparations, travelling to and working and living in the host country, and 
permanent or temporary return.  
Access to information: Although this has already improved, major efforts are still needed to provide 
(potential) migrants with better, more reliable and up-to-date information about policies and 
procedures through, e.g., information and resource centers such as one-stop services, hotlines, radio 
programs, and text messaging systems. 
Sustainability 2014, 6 411 
 
 
Pre-departure training can help to maximize the benefits of migration while abroad and upon return  
Such training may address professional skills and working rights and include economic literacy 
programs about income, saving, spending, borrowing, banking, and sending remittances. It should also 
provide space for discussion about the possible negative aspects and social costs of migration and 
encourage participation by other family members.  
Further measures would include reducing the costs of mobility, such as passports and visas, 
providing efficient and cost-effective remittance transfer services through banks and other providers, 
creating remittance investment centers, offering loans for new ventures by migrants, and providing 
entrepreneurship courses or job-matching and re-integration services for interested returnees. There is 
not only a gender dimension to saving and investment behavior and entrepreneurship; they also often 
depend on the life stage of migrants or their family members and this should be taken into 
consideration so as to increase migrants’ economic influence. 
Welfare and human rights: The government of Nepal should integrate dimensions of human rights 
in its development vision such as post-MDG debates. The government and recruiting agencies have to 
establish measures to regulate recruitment and employment contracts, for example by developing a 
code of conduct and best practice, making employers at the destination jointly liable with recruitment 
agencies, installing placement fee ceilings and minimum working wages, requiring the destination 
government to create trust funds for migrants, and offering support through diplomatic missions to 
monitor a migrant's workplace.  
Protection of rights while abroad: All governments should repeal migration policies that violate 
human rights (safety, labour standards, decent work, international protection instruments), and all 
states should ratify and implement all relevant international human rights and international migration 
instruments. Nepal must opt for multilateral measures to protect rights and it must also involve host, 
transit and destination countries, as measures to protect the rights of migrants are difficult to enforce 
without the support from destination countries. Furthermore, governments should ensure skills 
accreditation or standardization, provide legal appeal procedures and counseling and rehabilitation  
of returnees. 
Integrating the ―absent‖ population:  At present, a large proportion of the population that 
represents their country’s future plays no part in training, capacity-building and rebuilding schemes in 
their home countries. However, as migrants often invest and have a major stake in decision-making 
processes and responsibilities in their households, policymakers and program officers should reflect 
this when they design programs and funding schemes, and returning migrants should be integrated 
into, and potentially attracted by, existing programs. 
Lastly, there is a need to improve the fundamental data (both quantitative and qualitative) for 
migration- and development-related topics. This could be done through better data collection and 
management and as well as encouraging research on migration and exchanges between research and 
practice, and creating research units in destination countries of Nepalese workers.  
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